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ABSTRACT
This paper asks whether the results obtained from using the standard approach to testing the
influential Grossman and Helpman “protection for sale (PFS)” model of political economy might
arise from a simpler setting. A model of imports and quotas with protection occurring in response
to import surges, but only for organized industries, is simulated and shown to provide parameter
estimates consistent with the protection for sale framework. This suggests that the standard approach
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kmk4@psu.edu1. Introduction
Over the past decade, the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of “Protection for
Sale” (PFS) has become the most inﬂuential one, both theoretically and empirically,
in the political economy of trade. Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandy-
opadhyay (2000), (GM and GB respectively from here on) were the ﬁrst few papers
that took the model to the data and found estimates consistent with the model.
While GM and GB use US data, Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu (2002)a n dM c -
Calman (2001) use Turkish and Australian data, respectively. Eicher and Osang
(2002)t e s tt h eP F Sm o d e la g a i n s ta na l t e r n a t i v et a r i ﬀ formation function model.
All of these studies provide additional evidence in favor of the PFS model. A key
prediction made by the PFS model in explaining protection levels is that organized
and unorganized industries have opposite signs for a key coeﬃcient. This prediction,
which diﬀers from that of other models, seems to be borne out in the data. In this
paper we ask whether this (compelling) result could be illusionary: that is, whether
results like this could arise even in the absence of the kind of behavior posited by
the PFS literature. We argue that a model where protection tends to be for the
organized, without being for “sale” as in the menu auction framework of Grossman
and Helpman (1994), generates data that, as far as protection levels alone go, gives
the same pattern for the key coeﬃcients in the PFS model. It also helps explain
some puzzling results in previous work.
More recently, researchers have extended the original PFS model in various di-
rections. Bombardini (2004) incorporates ﬁrm size into the protection equation.1
Gawande and Krishna (2004) incorporate foreign lobbies as well as domestic ones
while Gawande and Krishna (2005) add lobbying of both upstream and downstream
producers. Matschke and Sherlund (2004) add labor unions and labor immobility
1However, there are some problems with pinning down a unique equilibrium in her model.
2to the model. Facchini et al. (2004) construct and estimate the quota version of
the PFS model. While such extensions seem to provide more evidence in support of
the PFS model, they, in eﬀect, graft on additional complications onto the basic PFS
model and so provide evidence that other variables are also important. However,
they leave the basic predictions of the PFS model unchanged. For this reason, we
choose to look at the basic model and its key predictions.
Over the years, many “ﬂaws” of the PFS model have been highlighted.2 On the
theoretical side, there are three main concerns. First, is the question of whether
the model itself is a reasonable depiction of reality. Should lobbies be thought of
as “buying protection” in a menu auction as posited by this theory? Or is it that
contributions buy something else, like access to politicians? Ansolobehere et al.
(2002), for example, argue forcefully against thinking of contributions as buying
policy.
Second, as is well understood now, the menu auctions model on which the PFS
model is based, gives rise to a continuum of equilibria in general. The assumption that
bids are “locally truthful” is what pins down the equilibrium. This restriction makes
a g e n t sb i ds oa st ob ee q u a l l yw e l lo ﬀ whatever tariﬀ is chosen by the government.
However, the logic of this restriction in a static model in the absence of trembles
that might make the government choose randomly, is not apparent.
Third, the predictions of the PFS model have been depicted as “un-intuitive”.
The PFS model predicts that protection is higher the lower the import penetration
ratio.3 Intuition suggests that industries where import penetration used to be low and
has increased tend to be those where a comparative advantage existed but has been
eroded.4 It is in such industries that protectionist pressures would be largest. This is
2The issues raised below have been voiced in the literature, see Rodrik (1995), Helpman (1995),
and Gawande and Krishna (2003) for more on much of what follows.
3This is also predicted by the models of Findlay and Wellisz (1982) and Hillman (1982).
4Maybe, the problem is that this intuition on where protection occurs is basically dynamic, while
3consistent with non-tariﬀ barrier (NTB) coverage being positively and signiﬁcantly
related to the change in import penetration and the coeﬃcient on the level of import
penetration being insigniﬁcant, see Treﬂer (1993). When only import penetration
is used, as in Lee and Swagel (1997), then protection is positively and signiﬁcantly
related to it. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) argue that there is no inconsistency between
their results which support this prediction of the PFS model and the above empirical
regularity as import penetration enters additively in these models and interactively
with political organization in theirs.
On the empirical side, there is much room for improvement. First, as is usual with
any empirical enterprise, the data is far from perfect. Data on contributions is often
not available outside the US.5 In addition, the elasticity estimates commonly used,
those of Shiells, Deardorﬀ and Stern (1985) are dated and at the three digit level
of aggregation. Moreover, half the estimates are of the wrong sign or insigniﬁcant.6
More recent estimates at a disaggregated level need to be used since testing political
economy models, in particular, should be done at as disaggregated a level as possible.
Second, the results seem relatively fragile and the extent to which the estimation
does a stringent job of testing the PFS model is an open question.7 All of this makes
most models are static. One exception is the work of Brainard and Verdier (1993), which explains
the persistence of protection by pointing out that protection today raises production relative to
imports, which in turn, raises protection tomorrow.
5A way around this, using an iterative procedure, is proposed by Cadot et al. (2005). As a
by product they ﬁnd that their estimates of the weight on social welfare are lower than that on
contributions! However, how well their procedure performs is not as yet clear.
6They estimate import elasticity industry by industry by using OLS or 2SLS. Obviously, OLS
is subject to endogeneity and measurement error bias. 2SLS as executed by them is problematic
because the industry by industry sample size is very small and 2SLS has potentially serious ﬁnite
sample bias. Furthermore, they control for tariﬀs in their elasticity estimation but not for the
non-tariﬀ barrier. Hence, if researchers use their estimates, the reverse causality from non-tariﬀ
barrier to the import elasticity, which could arise with aggregation in the industry data, cannot be
controlled for.
7As the data used by GM is not available, it is hard to exactly replicate their work. GB’s data
is easily available, but neither we nor Bombardini (2004) could exactly replicate their results quan-
titatively, though we were able to do so qualitatively: more on this below. Close replication of the
4one wonder how much of what researchers are getting is due to choosing a set of
regression results that validates existing empirical work? How much of it is due to
the same forces at work in a variety of setups that result in estimates that look like
support for the model? How much of the work supposedly supporting the PFS model
actually tests for results that are common in a variety of diﬀerent models other than
PFS? For example, to what extent should ﬁrm size eﬀects mattering as in Bombardini
(2004) or protection on being lower when there are organized downstream users of
the industry’s output be seen as a validation of the PFS model? Would similar
predictions not arise in other models? All of this makes one suspect that the model
is, perhaps, not being subjected to the right kind of test in much of this work. These
concerns should not be taken negatively: these are hard questions to tackle. Rather,
they should be taken as an attempt to refocus attention on the key issues and so
guide future work.
Third, the size of estimated coeﬃcients for the various PFS models has also led
to some concern. In all the work we are aware of, the estimate of the weight on
contribution relative to welfare, which is derived from the estimated coeﬃcients,
tends to be low so that political economy factors seem to matter little. However, in
the PFS model, equilibrium contributions by a group keep the government as well
oﬀ as in the absence of the lobby group, i.e., just compensate the government, and
given that contributions are small relative to their eﬀects on ﬁrm proﬁts and welfare,
one would expect a reasonably high weight on contributions relative to welfare.8
The estimated low weight on contributions relative to welfare, we argue, could
have a number of causes. First, data on contributions is not actually used in the
estimation procedure of either GM or GB. The only paper we know that actually uses
results seems to depend on the exact combination of instruments used.In personal communication,
Gawande conﬁrmed this.
8See Rodrik (1995) for an early survey of political economy models in trade and Gawande and
Krishna (2003) for a recent one of the empirical work in the area.
5contribution data directly is Kee, Olarreaga, and Silva (2005). They assume lobbies
have a ﬁr s tm o v e ra d v a n t a g eo v e rg o v e r n m e n ta si st h en o r mi nt h i sl i t e r a t u r ea n d
look at foreign lobbying in the US for preferential access (which reduces tariﬀst o
zero or leaves them unchanged) assuming world prices are given.9 As a result, the
w e l f a r ec o s tt ot h eU Si st h el o s so ft a r i ﬀ revenue. This loss is, in essence, compared
to the contributions received to obtain a weight on contributions relative to welfare.
Their results suggest that the government seems to value contributions ﬁve times
more than welfare: a vast diﬀerence from the results using either the GM or GB
approach!
The standard approach basically estimates the predicted outcome of the PFS
model: protection in equilibrium is related to its determinants but contributions do
not explicitly enter this equation. Hence, there is no direct way for the low level of
contributions to inﬂuence the estimated weight on contributions relative to welfare!
Contributions are used to obtain a cutoﬀ above which industries are taken to be
organized in GM. They are used to see if lobbying expenditure follows predicted
patterns in GB, but are not used to estimate the key parameters of the model. If
contributions data was actually used to estimate a structural model, then the key
parameters might have been quite diﬀerent.10
Also, using data generated from a simpler model than PFS may yield similar esti-
mated coeﬃcients, but without the strict PFS interpretation. Thus, the supposedly
high values for the weight on welfare can be thought of as just a misinterpretation
of the parameter estimates. This is the key idea that we explore in this paper. We
argue that a simple setting, where government provides protection for politically or-
ganized industries when imports exceed a trigger level, is also consistent with the
9In their model, preferences are given if contributions compensate for this welfare loss. Contri-
butions are oﬀered if the increase in proﬁts exceed the full cost of obtaining them. In equilibrium,
contributions leave the government as well oﬀ as without lobbying.
10We are exploring this avenue in ongoing work.
6estimates in the literature. In other words, a setting where there are provisions for
preventing a surge of imports, but only organized industries can actually make use of
these provisions, perhaps because they can overcome the usual free rider problems,
could explain the size of the estimates obtained!
In this paper, we simulate a simple equilibrium model of domestic consumption
and imports, where imports in the politically organized sector are subject to an
exogenously and uniformly set quota. There are no quotas if a sector is not organized.
Political organization is set exogenously and randomly. Obviously, in this simple
model of quotas, there is no strict protection for sale eﬀect. Parameters are set
so the simulated data roughly match the basic statistics of the actual data. Then,
we estimate the key equation of the PFS model on the artiﬁcial data following the
procedures by GM and GB. We obtain coeﬃcient estimates that are consistent with
the protection for sale paradigm! We then explain where our estimates are coming
from. We also consider the analogous tariﬀ setting version of the model and show
that our results also go through there.
The paper proceeds as follows. The PFS model is laid out in the next section.
Section 3 then develops a simple model of imports and quotas with protection oc-
curring in response to import surges, but only for the organized industries, which we
calibrate to broadly match the data. We then generate data from it. Section 4 then
runs the standard regressions on the simulated data and shows that the standard
results are obtained despite the absence of any strict PFS eﬀects. Section 5 veriﬁes
that our results go through even with tariﬀs. Section 6 then explains why this is
happening. Section 7 suggests and runs some further robustness tests using GB’s
data. Section 8 concludes.
72. The PFS Model and Its Estimation
The exposition in this section relies heavily on Grossman and Helpman (1994). There
is a continuum of individuals, each of inﬁnitesimal size. Each individual has prefer-
ences that are linear in the consumption of the numeraire good and are additively
separable across all goods. As a result, there are no income eﬀects and no cross price
eﬀects in demand which comes from equating marginal utility to own price. On the
production side, there is perfect competition in a speciﬁc factor setting: each good
is produced by a factor speciﬁc to the industry, ki in industry i, and a mobile factor,
labor, L. Thus, each speciﬁcf a c t o ri st h er e s i d u a lc l a i m a n ti ni t si n d u s t r y .S o m ei n -
dustries are organized, and being organized or not is exogenous to the model. Tariﬀ
revenue is redistributed to all agents in a lump sum manner. Owners of the speciﬁc
factors in organized industries can make contributions to the government to try and
inﬂuence policy if it is worth their while.
Government cares about both social welfare and the contributions made to it and
puts a relative weight of α on social welfare. The timing of the game is as follows:
ﬁrst, lobbies simultaneously bid contribution functions that specify the contributions
made contingent on the trade policy adopted (which determines domestic prices).
The government then chooses what to do to maximize its own objective function.
In this way, the government is the common agent that all principals (organized
lobbies) are trying to inﬂuence. Such games are known to have a continuum of
equilibria.11 By restricting agents to bids that are “truthful”, so that their bids
11Given the bids of all other lobbies, each lobby wants a particular outcome to occur, namely,
the one where it obtains the greatest beneﬁt less cost. This can be attained by oﬀering the minimal
contribution needed for that outcome to be chosen by the government. However, what is oﬀered
for other outcomes (which is part of the bid function) is not fully pinned down as given other bids,
it is irrelevant. However, bids at other outcomes aﬀect the optimal choices of other lobbies and as
their behavior aﬀects yours, multiplicity arises naturally. Uniqueness is obtained by pinning down
the bids at all outcomes to yeild the same payoﬀ as at the desired one.
8have the same curvature as their welfare, a unique equilibrium is obtained.12 The
equilibrium outcome, thus, is as if the government was maximizing weighted social
welfare (W(p) where p is the domestic price and equals the tariﬀ vector plus the
world price vector, p∗) with a greater weight on the welfare of organized industries.











where πj(pj) is producer surplus in industry j, lj is labor employed in industry j, wage
is unity,
Nj
N is the share of workers employed in the jth industry, while T(p)+S(P)
is the sum of tariﬀ revenue and consumer surplus in the economy.
This is the great charm of the PFS model: not only does it cleanly model where
both the demand and the supply of protection are coming from, but the results can
be derived from a simple maximization exercise! Small wonder it is so popular.
Diﬀerentiating Wi(p) with respect to pj gives13
xj(pj)δij + αi
£






where so δij =1if i = j and 0 otherwise, αi is the share of labor employed in industry
i, m0
j(pj) is the derivative of the demand for imports, and xj(pj)=π0
j(pj) denotes
12For a detailed discussion of this concept, see Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
13This follows from the derivative of consumer surplus from good j with respect to pj being equal
to −dj(pj),w h e r edj(pj) is the demand for good j.































αi = αL, the employment share of organized industries and
P
i∈J0
δij = Ij is
unity if j is organized and zero otherwise. Thus, the above is the same as




j(pj)(α + αL)=0 .
Using the fact that (pj − p∗
j)=( tj)p∗













mj(pj) and ej = −m0
j(pj)
pj
mj(pj). This is the basis of the key estimating
equation. Note that protection is predicted to be positively related to
zj
ej if the
industry is organized, but negatively related to it if the industry is not organized,





ej, γ and δ b e l o w ,c a nb eu s e dt oi n f e rt h ew e i g h to nw e l f a r ep l a c e db yg o v e r n m e n t .
It is easy to verify that α =
1+γ
δ and αL =
−γ
δ . An even stronger prediction is that
zj and ej do not enter separately once their ratio is controlled for.










The error term is interpreted as the composite of variables potentially aﬀecting pro-
tection that may have been left out, and the measurement error of the dependent
variable. Both GB and GM used the coverage ratios for non-tariﬀ barriers as tj
instead of the tariﬀ itself. GB estimated a variant of equation (2.1) together with
the other equations which determine the political contribution and the inverse im-
port penetration ratio. Their protection for sale equation also accounts for tariﬀso n
intermediate goods and adds as explanatory variables the tariﬀ a n dN T B so ni n t e r -
mediates goods used by the industry. As shown in Grossman and Helpman (1994),
protection for the ﬁnal good is increasing in that of the intermediate inputs used. To
consistently estimate the above equation (since the inverse import penetration ratio
and the import elasticity could be endogenous), they used a nonlinear IV estimation
technique proposed by Kelejian (1971).
GM explicitly considered the corner solution of the protection measure on the
LHS. Using full information maximum likelihood, they estimated the following sys-
tem of equations. First, the “true level of protection” in industry i, the latent variable
t∗





= γzi + δIizi +  i. (2.2)
The true protection level is a multiple of the coverage ratio which lies between zero
14Note that ej is moved to the left hand side to alleviate concerns about its endogeneity. Also,
they actually use 1+zi not zi which results in a few complications as discussed later.














i ≥ µ (2.3)
where µ is exogenously set at the value 1, 2, or 3.15 Domestic production to import
ratios are related to a variety of factors in
zi = ς
0











i ≤ 0 (2.5)
where I∗
i is a latent variable for political organization, and R1i and R2i are vectors
of exogenous variables. The key parameters γ and δ have the predicted signs and
are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. No matter what level of µ is used, the estimate of α
is high (over 49) and αL is close to unity (over .95), though as expected, a high µ
reduces the estimates of α and αL.( A h i g h µ raises true tariﬀs and this, in turn,
is consistent with a higher δ and lower γ and hence, lower weight on welfare and a
lower degree of organization.
15Though there is no reason for µ not to be less than unity as quotas may be barely binding.
123. A Simple Model of Imports
We now develop a simple model of imports that we will simulate. To match the key
statistics of the data, our model has to have several features. First, in the data some
industries are politically organized and others are not. To match the data, in our
model we simply assume political organization is randomly determined. Second, in
the data some politically organized industries are protected by quota and others are
not. To capture that in a simple way, we assume that politically organized industries
whose equilibrium imports exceed some level would face a quota.
First, consider the domestic and foreign goods equilibrium without quota. For
each industry i and subindustry j, there are two types of goods: domestic and foreign
goods. To make matters simple, we assume that each good’s demand depends only
on its own price and random shocks and that home is the only source of demand.
Let xH
ij be the equilibrium quantity of home goods in industry i subindustry j,a n d
let pH
ij be its equilibrium price.
The equilibrium is described by the demand and supply equations. The demand
for industry i subindustry j of the home good depends on a constant, the price of
the good, and random terms as follows:
lnx
Hd
ij = ahd1 + ahd2 lnp
H
ij + xhdi + uhdij. (3.1)
Similarly, the supply of the same good follows the supply equation:
lnx
Hs
ij = ahs1 + ahs2 lnp
H
ij + xhsi + uhsij. (3.2)
The random terms xhdi and xhsi are industry speciﬁc demand and supply shocks,
and hence, common across all subindustries, while uhdij and uhsij are subindustry
speciﬁc demand and supply shocks and are idiosyncratic to each subindustry. All
13shocks are assumed to be i.i.d. with normal distributions though the parameters of
the distribution diﬀer. Thus, for all i, xhdi has mean 0 a n ds t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o nσxhd,
while uhsi has mean 0 and standard deviation σxhs. Similarly, for all ij, uhdij has









Similarly, let import demand be given by
lnx
Md
ij = amd1 + amd2 lnp
M




ij = ams1 + ams2 lnp
M
ij + xmsi + umsij. (3.5)
As before, the random terms xmdi,x m s i,u m d ij,a n dumsij are industry and subindus-
try speciﬁc demand and supply shocks. They are distributed i.i.d. normally with









We assume that there are nt =2 0 0industries and each industry has nj =6
subindustries. Each subindustry ij is politically organized with probability Po i. We
allow for some variation in the political organization probability across industries:
Poi =0 .9 with probability 0.3,, Po i =0 .8 with probability 0.2,P o i =0 .7 with
probability 0.2, and Po i =0 .1 with probability 0.3. This is done to ensure that there
is suﬃcient variation in the numbers of subindustries that are politically organized
within industries. If we had only one probability of political organization for every
14industry, say .6, the fraction of industries that are politically organized will be clus-
tered around .6. We simulate political organization by generating a (0,1) uniformly
distributed random variable upi, and generate independently another (0,1) uniformly
distributed random variable uoij.I fupi ≤ 0.3,t h e nIij =1if uoij ≤ 0.1.I ij =0oth-
erwise. If 0.3 <u pi ≤ 0.5,t h e nIij =1if uoij ≤ 0.7 and Iij =0otherwise. If
0.5 <u pi ≤ 0.7,t h e nIij =1if uoij ≤ 0.8 and Iij =0otherwise. If 0.7 <u pi,t h e n
Iij =1if uoij ≤ 0.8 and Iij =0otherwise.
We simulate the output and prices of each industry by ﬁrst drawing nt industry
demand and supply shocks xmdi and xmsi for i =1 ,...,n t and for each industry i,
drawing ns subindustry demand and supply shocks umdij and umsij for j =1 ,...,ns.
Then, given these shocks and parameters of the demand and supply equations, we
compute the equilibrium price and quantities for each subindustry ij.
We now introduce a uniform quota level ˆ Q for all subindustries. That is, the quota
becomes binding in industry ij if the equilibrium output for the foreign goods exceeds
ˆ Q.L e td
q
ij be the indicator for a binding quota. That is, if xMe
ij for subindustry ij
exceeds ˆ Q, then actual imports, xM
ij ,e q u a l ˆ Q and d
q





ij =0 . One way of interpreting this is that there is a trigger level of imports, ˆ Q,
above which the relevant agency would restrict imports if asked, but only politically
organized agencies ask for such protection. In other words, that there are provisions
for preventing a surge of imports, but only organized industries can actually make use
of these provisions perhaps because they can overcome the usual free rider problems.
Next we aggregate subindustry output to the industry level. Total industry equi-



















We then generate the variables that we used in the estimation as follows. First,











That is, coverage ratio is the fraction of industry output i where quota is binding.
Furthermore, the inverse import penetration ratio, zi, for industry i is the ratio of















In other words, we call industry i politically organized if more than half of its
subindustries are politically organized.
We chose the parameters of the above model so that the simulation is reasonably
close to the actual data in several dimensions. The parameters of the home goods
16demand and supply equations are: ahd1 =4 .0, ahd2 = −1.3, ahs1 =3 .4, ahs2 =1 .4,
amd1 =1 .4, amd2 = −1.5027, ams1 =1 .4, ams2 =1 .0.
The import demand elasticity, i.e., −amd2, is set at the mean of the industry
import demand elasticity from the estimation of Shiells et. al. (1986). Furthermore,
σxhd = σxhs =2 .0,σ xmd = σxms =0 .48,
σuhd = σuxhs =0 .2,σ umd = σums =0 .05.
In Table 1, we compare the simulation of the model to the data used in GB. The
simulation size is 1000. The model matches the average political organization, NTB
coverage ratio, log output/import ratio, and the standard error of log output import
ratio reasonably closely.
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Simulation Data
Political organization frequency 0.626 0.680
NTB positive 0.541 0.533
Average log output/import ratio 2.354 2.783
Std. error of log output/import ratio 1.347 1.620
Notice that we did not vary the import demand elasticity because, together with
the uniform quota level, it would generate correlation between the import demand
elasticity and the NTB coverage ratio in the simulation, which we wanted to purge
from the model.
174. Estimating the Model Using Simulated Data
Next we generate data using the simple model of protection outlined above. Then
we estimate the standard protection equation by following the procedures of both
GB and GM.
4.1. OLS-IV Regression
To replicate the IV estimation done by GB, we generated 200 data points from our
simple model and estimated the following equation by three stage least squares. Note
that we scale variables by dividing by 10,000 so that estimated parameters are larger,
as done by GB.
Ci
1+Ci







Note that we use 1+z, not z, as GB and GM use consumption (which equals
domestic production plus imports in the standard homogeneous good model) relative
to imports, not production relative to imports. Thus, they in eﬀect use 1+z and
we follow their lead for comparability. Note however, that due to the presence of the
interaction term, I(1 + z), this choice of variable results in some mis-speciﬁcation
which could aﬀect the estimates of γ and δ as well as β0. However, the impact of
using one versus the other turns out to be quite small in GM but larger in our model.
We say more on this when we discuss our maximum likelihood estimation below.
We report the OLS regression, 3 stage least squares regression results where
the instruments are the exogenous home demand and supply shocks and political
organization shocks: xhdi,xhs i,u pi.( 3SLS 1). We also run another 3 stage least
squares regression where the instruments include the above exogenous variables, their
square terms, and interactions (3SLS 2) .T h er e s u l t sa r es h o w ni nT a b l e2.
All the parameter estimates as well as their standard errors are the average of 10
18simulation/estimation exercises. Notice that in all the above estimates, the coeﬃ-
cients on (1+zi) are signiﬁcantly negative, the coeﬃcients on Ii(1+zi) are signiﬁcantly
positive, and the sums of these two coeﬃcients are positive, just as the PFS model
predicts.
Table 2. Regression Results
































α 355.15 73.11 166.50 3178.67 93.46
αL 0.8308 0.6761 0.6854 0.9819 0.8773
Standard errors are shown in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. GB is from the ﬁrst column in Table 3A (p.145). GM is from
the ﬁrst column in Table 3A (p.145). GM is from the ﬁrst column in Table 1 (p.1145).
Note that our estimates are an order of magnitude larger than those of GB, but
as will be seen, are close to those estimated by GM as well as those estimated for the
simulated data following the procedure of GM. We use a sample size of 200 as this is
close to that used in both GB and GM. The IV estimates, which are consistent, may
b es u b j e c tt os m a l ls a m p l eb i a sa st h es a m p l es i z eo f200 may be a bit small. To see if
there was a signiﬁcant bias in the mean we also ran the same simulation/estimation
exercises once with the simulation sample size of 1000.T a b l e3 reports these results.
As is evident, the estimates do diﬀer as expected, but the estimates for the coeﬃcients
in both table 2 and 3 follow the patterns predicted by PFS: the coeﬃcients of (1+zi)
are signiﬁcantly negative, the coeﬃcients of (1 + zi) times the political organization
19dummy are signiﬁcantly positive, and the sums of these two coeﬃcients are positive.
Moreover, their sizes are roughly the same as those in GM (recall we need to divide
these coeﬃcients by 10,000 to make them comparable to GM’s).
In both table 2 and 3,t h ev a l u eo fα is “too high” to be reasonable.16 All of this
comes about in spite of the fact that the data comes from a simple model where the
quota is set exogenously at a uniform level in all subindustries, the import elasticity is
set constant across all industries, and political organization is completely exogenous
to the system. That is, it is fair to say that the simulated data comes from a much
less restrictive model than that of protection for sale.
Table 3. Regression Results
































α 282.28 63.64 128.98 3178.67 93.46
αL 0.7540 0.6494 0.6981 0.9819 0.8773
Standard errors are shown in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. GB is from the ﬁrst column in Table 3A (p.145). GM is
from the ﬁrst column in Table 1(p.1145).
4.2. Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Next we follow GM and assume the error terms of the equations (2.2), (2.4), and
(2.5) are jointly normally distributed. That is, ( i,u 1i,u 2i)˜ N(0,Σ). We use full-
16The large value of α comes in large part from low estimates of δ: recall, that as α =
1+γ
δ , small
changes in δ give large changes in α especially at low values of δ.
20information maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters of the model, where
the instruments for (1 + zi) are the exogenous home demand and supply shocks
and political organization shocks: R1i =( xhdi,xhs i,u pi).T h e i n s t r u m e n t s f o r t h e
political organization dummy are the exogenous demand and supply shocks as well
as the political organization shocks: R2i =( xhdi,xhs i,xmd i,xms i,u pi).A g a i n ,w e
conducted 10 simulation/estimation exercises and took the average of those results.
The estimation results are shown in Table 4. Speciﬁcation 1 estimates the orig-
inal equation system (2.2)-(2.5) taking µ =1 . Speciﬁcation 2 adds a constant to
equation (2.2), and speciﬁcation 3 further adds the political organization dummy
to the RHS of equation (2.2). In both speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcient of (1 + zi) is
negative and signiﬁcant and that of the product of the political organization dummy
and (1 + zi) is positive and signiﬁcant. In both speciﬁcations 1 and 2,t h es u mo f
the coeﬃcients of the terms that include (1 + zi) is positive, which is in line with
the results of GM. Again, we obtain results consistent with the protection for sale
model of Grossman and Helpman (1994), reported in column 4 and 5 of Table 4,even
though the simulated model comes from a model where protection occurs in response
to import surges, but only for the organized, and not the strict PFS model. Also,
the estimate of α is still “too high”.
Speciﬁcation 3 adds a political organization dummy. This allows the intercept to
diﬀer for organized and unorganized industries. Note that only the intercepts remain
signiﬁcant. In fact, in this small sample case, it looks like organized industries are
protected and the remainder get negative protection. Our stark result seems to arise
from small sample bias and goes away when the sample size increases to 1000.T h e s e
are presented in Table 5. Note that GM are careful to estimate this speciﬁcation
as part of their speciﬁcation checks, see Table A3 in their Appendix, and ﬁnd that,
allowing for diﬀerent intercepts for organized and unorganized industries results in
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients for the intercepts and does not aﬀect their estimates for γ
21and δ by much. Their estimates are reported in Column 5 of Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4. Maximum Likelihood Results



































α 88.46 83.62 396.38 93.46
αL 0.6508 0.8674 1.033 0.8773
Log likelihood -971.97 -968.61 -950.18
Standard errors are shown in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. βI is the coeﬃcient on Ii. GM is from the third column in
Table 1 (p.1145).
Overall, the results in Table 5 are consistent with PFS: γ is positive and sig-
niﬁcant, δ is negative and signiﬁcant and their sum is positive. The intercept in
speciﬁcation 2 is positive and signiﬁcant and this is clearly coming from the absence
of separate intercepts for organized and unorganized ﬁrms. However, in speciﬁca-
tion 3, while the intercept is signiﬁcantly negative and the organization dummy is
signiﬁcantly positive as in Table 4, the coeﬃcients γ and δ remain signiﬁcant, with
the “correct” signs, and with their sum positive. The implied estimate of α remains
“too high”. One small inconsistency is worth noting. If we add both constant term
and the political organization dummy to the RHS of the PFS equation, both in GM
and our case, the constant term is estimated to be negative and the coeﬃcient of the
political organization dummy positive. If the true model is the PFS equation (2.2)
b u tw eu s ez∗







i − 1) + δIi (z
∗
i − 1) +  i




i +  i.
Now, because γ<0 and δ>0, the constant term should be estimated to be positive
and the coeﬃcient on the political organization dummy to be negative, which is
neither the case in our results nor in GM’s. In both results the constant terms have
negative and the political organization dummies have positive coeﬃcients. In this
sense, one could argue that our and GM’s results are not in line with the PFS model.
Table 5. Maximum Likelihood Results



































α 51.57 48.56 163.03 52.93
αL 0.6328 0.7482 0.6564 0.833
Log likelihood -4755.9 -4749.2 -4685.7
Standard errors are shown in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. βI is the coeﬃcient on Ii. GM is from the third column
in Table 1 (p.1145) of their paper.
Note that our estimates are signiﬁcant, while theirs are not, and adding the
constant and dummy for organization aﬀects their results less than ours. Why might
these diﬀerences arise?
We have three explanations for why our estimates for the constant and dummy
23are more signiﬁcant than theirs. First, their sample size is quite small (107)a n dt h i s
may well result in imprecise estimates when using maximum likelihood techniques
where the estimator is merely consistent. Recall that our results in Table 4 and 5
diﬀer a fair deal. Second, since the true model is
ti
1+ti
ei = β0 + β1Ii + γ (1 + zi)+δIi (1 + zi)
if one omits Ii, the estimate of δ will be biased upward (as occurs in Table 4 and 5)
due to the positive correlation of β1Ii and δIi (1 + zi). The correlation between Ii
and (1 + zi) is smaller in the data (0.105)t h a nt h eo n ei nt h es i m u l a t i o n( 0.325)which
explains why our results change more than those of GM. The correlation between Ii
and (1 + zi) is high for the simulated data because of the uniform quota level. When
quota is binding for a subindustry, its import is constant. We ﬁnd it noteworthy
that even in this simple setup, we obtain a signiﬁcant and negative value for γ
and a signiﬁcant and positive value for δ despite allowing for diﬀerent intercepts for
organized and unorganized industries as required by the PFS model when 1+z is
used instead of z! Third, the data on z in GM is clustered away from the origin
since it is for the US, a large economy, and hence with a low ratio of imports to
domestic production in most industries. In addition, there is more variance in the
dependent variable in the data than in our simulated data as we keep e constant. As
ar e s u l t ,ag r e a t e rv a r i a t i o ni nt h ed e p e n d e n t variable is being explained by a smaller
variation in the explanatory ones in GM. This could be an additional reason for the
insigniﬁcance of the intercept term in the GM results.
245. Tariﬀsi n s t e a do fQ u o t a s
Although most of the empirical work estimating the Grossman and Helpman model
uses NTB’s as proxies for tariﬀs, there are some notable exceptions such as McCalman
(2004), who uses Australian data on tariﬀs. In this section, we simulate a simple
equilibrium model of trade with exogenously determined tariﬀ levels, which has the
same spirit as our equilibrium model with quotas. We solve the model and estimate
the protection for sale model on the simulated data using tariﬀs not quotas. Again,
we obtain parameter results consistent with the protection for sale framework, even
though the model from which the data was generated is far from the strict PFS one.
As before, equations (3.1) − (3.3), and (3.4) − (3.6) deﬁne the demand, supply and
equilibrium for domestic goods and imports respectively.
The parameterization is the same as in the quota case except for the inclusion
of the uniform tariﬀ t in the import demand equation. We set a uniform import
tolerance level ˆ Q for all sub industries. We assume that if the equilibrium output
for the foreign goods exceeds ˆ Q, then government imposes an uniform tariﬀ t = .1.
Otherwise, the tariﬀ is set to be 0.L e tdt
ij be the indicator that takes on the value
of one if the tariﬀ is positive. That is, dt
ij =1if xMe




ij , otherwise. For industries with positive tariﬀs, the industry demand
equation becomes as follows:
lnx
Md






+ xmdi + umdij
Equilibrium under the tariﬀ is computed by equalizing industry demand and sup-
ply. The output, (1 + zi), and political organization for each industry are computed
by aggregating over subindustries, just as in the quota model. The industry level






Generating data from our model, we replicate GB’s results by estimating the
following equation by OLS and 3SLS:
ti
1+ti







The results presented in Table 6 are the average of 10 simulation/estimation
exercises with the sample size of 200, while those in Table 7 are based on the sample
size of 1000.
Table 6. Regression Results






















α 2285.43 427.38 984.90
αL 0.9393 0.6590 0.6748
Standard errors are shown in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical
signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
We see that the results are fully consistent with the protection for sale model,
even though the simple tariﬀ model from which we generated data is quite diﬀerent
from the PFS one. Table 8 depicts the ML estimates of the model. The ﬁrst column
shows the average of the 10 simulation/estimation exercise with sample size being
200, and the second column shows that of one simulation/estimation exercise with
26Table 7. Regression Results






















α 1872.26 372.99 765.50
αL 0.8436 0.6245 0.6736
Standard errors are shown in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical
signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
sample size of 1000. They also are consistent with the protection for sale model.
Again, in both Tables 7 and 8 the value of α is “too high”.
Table 8. Maximum Likelihood Results













Log likelihood -713.0 -3457.9
Standard errors are shown in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical
signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
276. Why the Simulation Results?
Why is it that we spuriously estimate a protection for sale eﬀect from the simulated
data? In this section, we try to explain the reason by using an even simpler model of
protection, which does not even have any aggregation over subindustries. Suppose
that the demand for and supply of home goods have no random component:
lnX
Hd





i = ahs1 + ahs2 lnp
H
i .
























i = ams1 + ams2 lnp
H
i + xmsi.










We set the parameters so as to set the foreign goods equilibrium to be as follows.
lnX
M
i = −1.0+2 .0Ui,
where Ui is assumed to be uniformly distributed on [0,1]. This gives the desired
level of imports. Also, we set the uniform quota level, ˆ Q =1 , so ln ˆ Q =0 . As before,
organization is random and there is a .5 chance of being organized. Protection occurs
if the quota is binding and the industry is organized. There is, of course, no strict
PFS.




=0 , if ln(X
M





= .5, if ln(X
M
i )=−1.0+2 .0Ui ≥ 0.
Since the probability of being organized is .5, with a large enough number of
industries, half of them will be organized and half will not. For the half that are not















i )=−1.0+2 .0Ui < 0,
=2 , if ln(X
M
i )=−1.0+2 .0Ui ≥ 0.
Now consider that we have drawn 2000 industries. For a large enough sample
size, in any realization, roughly half will be organized. To illustrate the intuition, we
take exactly half to be organized. Number the industries that are not organized by
integers between 1 and 1000 with a higher index given to the industry with a larger
Ui. Similarly, number the industries that are organized by integers between 1001
and 2000 with a higher index given to the industry with a higher Ui. Only industries
with an index above 1000 will ever get protection. As the number of draws gets large
enough, we would expect to see a uniform empirical distribution of the realizations
of Ui. To capture this in our picture below, we place one ﬁrm at each integer. That
is, we assume that industry i has Ui = i
1000 for i =1 ,...,1000,a n dUi = i−1000
1000 for
i =1 0 0 1 ,...,2000. Industries with an index higher than or equal to 1500 will have
the quota invoked and be binding while industries with an index below the cutoﬀ,
while organized, never have the quota invoked.
Figure 1 plots the Ui and the import quantity. Notice that for industry i =
1001,...,2000, which are politically organized, the quota binds and import quantity
30equals the quota when Ui is large (industries 1500 to 2000).
Figure 2 plots the protection measure. The coverage ratio is positive only for
industries that are politically organized and whose quota is binding, i.e., industries
1500 to 2000. Their protection measure is .5. Thus, the protection measure in Figure
2 is what we need to ﬁt.
31Figure 3 plots 1+ zi. As we can see, this is high for industries with small imports
and low for industries with large imports. It is constant for industries with index
1500 to 2000 because of the binding quota.
32We next plot the 1+zi times the political organization dummy in Figure 4, i.e.,
Ii (1 + zi). Notice that for industries 1 to 1000, Ii (1 + zi) is zero because they are
never politically organized.
Let us try to ﬁt the protection measure in Figure 2 by using (1 + zi) (Figure 3)










(1 + z)+0 .0921
(0.0035)
I (1 + z)
Again, note the opposite signs of γ and δ as in the PFS model. Figure 5 plots
the dependent variable and the model prediction.
33There seems to be a positive correlation between protection and (1 + zi) for
politically organized industries but a negative one between protection and (1 + zi)
for non organized industries. This is what the regression is picking up.
We can conﬁrm the above insight by looking at the regression results from a
diﬀerent angle, i.e., by using the partitioned regression. Let RIPi be the component
of (1 + zi) that is orthogonal to Ii (1 + zi). It is obtained by regressing (1 + zi) on
the constant term and Ii (1 + zi) and taking the residual. The blue line in Figure 6
plots this orthogonal component.
34Due to the properties of the partitioned regression, the coeﬃcients of the OLS
regression of the protection measure on the orthogonal component gives the coeﬃ-
cient on (1+zi) back. As can be seen from the graph, the thin line is the orthogonal
component of the (1 + zi), which clearly is negatively correlated with the protection
measure, which is the reason for the negative coeﬃcient of the (1+zi) in the original
OLS.
T h ed o t t e dl i n ei nF i g u r e7 is the prediction by the constant term and the or-
thogonal component. Similarly, let RIIPi be the component of Ii (1 + zi) that is
orthogonal to (1 + zi). We obtain it by regressing Ii (1 + zi) on the constant term
and (1 + zi) and taking the residual. The thin line in Figure 7 plots the orthogonal
component.
35Again, the coeﬃcient of the OLS regression of the protection measure on the
orthogonal component gives the coeﬃcient on Ii (1 + zi) back. As can be seen from
the graph, the thin line is the orthogonal component of Ii(1 + zi),w h i c hc l e a r l yi s
positively correlated with the protection measure, which is the reason for the positive
coeﬃcient of (1 + zi) in the original OLS.
The qualitative aspects of the above results do not change if we used IV estimation
with Ui, U2
i as instruments instead of OLS. In Table 9, we show the estimation results
o ft h es a m ee q u a t i o nw h e r ew eu s e(1 + zi) and its square as instruments. In this
case, not only are the signs right but γ + δ>0, which is even more consistent with
the PFS model.
Conventional empirical studies in trade estimating the political economy eﬀects
use non-tariﬀ barriers as a proxy for tariﬀ protection measures, even though non-tariﬀ
barriers could be better interpreted as quotas. The above results show that the real
reason behind the results in support of PFS models could be the diﬀerence between
the quota being binding and non-binding. That is, δIi (1 + zi),δ>0 ﬁts well for
36the industries under quota (1500 to 2000) and industries that are not politically
organized, but does not ﬁt well for industries that are politically organized but not
under quota (1001 to 1499).
Table 9. 2SLS Estimates




On the other hand, γ (1 + zi),γ<0 ﬁts well for industries that are politically
organized since those with high equilibrium imports face binding quotas, but ﬁts
very poorly for those that are not politically organized. Hence, it is natural that
combining both would give the best ﬁt, and these results correspond to the signs
obtained by GM and others. Similar interpretations can be oﬀered for the tariﬀ
version in Section 6.
7. Robustness Checks for PFS
The original Grossman and Helpman (1994) model imposes a strong structural model
restriction on the data. There has been some work done to check the robustness of
the Protection for Sale results with respect to the changes in the model speciﬁcations.
Examples include GM, GB,17 Facchini et al. (2004), and others. In this section, we
further examine the model speciﬁcation issue, in particular, we check for the robust-
ness of the assumption that in equation (2.1) only the inverse import penetration
17Their original working paper version had alternative speciﬁcations that included production
and imports separately as well as their ratio, but this did not survive in the published version.
37matters and not imports or domestic production, once inverse import penetration
has been controlled for. We use part of the data used by GB to estimate various
speciﬁcations of the Protection for Sale equation. The results are summarized in
Table 10.
Table 10. Robustness Checks




























Standard errors are shown in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. INTERMTAR is the average tariﬀ and INTERMNTB
is the average NTB coverage ratio on intermediate goods.
We used IV’s similar to Bombardini (2004) ﬁrst, to replicate GB’s results. These
results come under the heading of Speciﬁc a t i o n1 .T h es i z eo ft h ec o e ﬃcients diﬀers
from that of GB whose estimate of γ in their small model is -3.088 with a standard
error of 1.532 and that of δ is 3.145 with a standard error of 1.575. So the signs
and magnitudes of γ and δ are similar but the sum of the two is slightly negative in
our estimates and slightly positive in theirs. We have not been able to obtain the
38estimates in their large model but hope to fully replicate their results once we obtain
more information from them.
If we add log of import value and log of consumption value to the RHS, as in
Speciﬁcation 2, then even though the signs remain the same, these coeﬃcients are no
longer signiﬁcant or close to being signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence interval, whereas
log consumption value is signiﬁcant. This suggests that the strong functional form
predictions derived from the PFS model may not be supported in the data.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we suggest that the usual tests of the PFS model are actually also
consistent with a simpler model where protection tends to occur when imports surge
and the industry is organized. Since our model does not allow the estimates of γ and
δ to be used to construct a weight on welfare placed by the government, there is no
puzzle regarding the high weight on welfare generated by these “tests” of the PFS
model.
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